Comparative Probability, Comparative Confirmation, and the “Conjunction Fallacy”
| Abstract | In the first edition of LFP, Carnap [2] undertakes a precise probabilistic explication of the concept of confirmation. This is where modern confirmation theory was born (in sin). Carnap was interested mainly in quantitative confirmation (which he took to be fundamental). But, he also gave (derivative) qualitative and comparative explications: • Qualitative. E inductively supports H. • Comparative. E supports H more strongly than E supports H . • Quantitative. E inductively supports H to degree r . Carnap begins by clarifying the explicandum (the informal “inductive support” concept) in various ways, including. | |||||||||
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