David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In the ﬁrst edition of LFP, Carnap  undertakes a precise probabilistic explication of the concept of conﬁrmation. This is where modern conﬁrmation theory was born (in sin). Carnap was interested mainly in quantitative conﬁrmation (which he took to be fundamental). But, he also gave (derivative) qualitative and comparative explications: • Qualitative. E inductively supports H. • Comparative. E supports H more strongly than E supports H . • Quantitative. E inductively supports H to degree r . Carnap begins by clarifying the explicandum (the informal “inductive support” concept) in various ways, including.
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