|Abstract||Slide #0 (Title). Before I get underway, I’d like to quickly thank a few people. First, Jonathan Vogel and John MacFarlane for working behind the scenes to make this thing happen. And, of course, David Christensen for chairing, and Patrick Maher and Jim Joyce for participating. I especially want to thank Patrick for his terriﬁc feedback on my work this term, which has helped me to get much clearer on my project. Before we get started, does everyone have a handout? The handout contains all the slides I will be going through. That’s almost everything I’m going to say. The script from which I am reading today will only occasionally embellish what’s written on the slides (like right now, for instance). OK, now onto today’s agenda.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||No categories specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
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