FOIL axiomatized

Studia Logica 84 (1):1 - 22 (2006)
In an earlier paper, [5], I gave semantics and tableau rules for a simple firstorder intensional logic called FOIL, in which both objects and intensions are explicitly present and can be quantified over. Intensions, being non-rigid, are represented in FOIL as (partial) functions from states to objects. Scoping machinery, predicate abstraction, is present to disambiguate sentences like that asserting the necessary identity of the morning and the evening star, which is true in one sense and not true in another.In this paper I address the problem of axiomatizing FOIL. I begin with an interesting sublogic with predicate abstraction and equality but no quantifiers. In [2] this sublogic was shown to be undecidable if the underlying modal logic was at least K4, though it is decidable in other cases. The axiomatization given is shown to be complete for standard logics without a symmetry condition. The general situation is not known. After this an axiomatization for the full FOIL is given, which is straightforward after one makes a change in the point of view.
Keywords Philosophy   Computational Linguistics   Mathematical Logic and Foundations   Logic
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Melvin Fitting (2004). First-Order Intensional Logic. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 127 (1-3):171-193.

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