David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Jessica Pfeifer & Sahotra Sarkar (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. Routledge (2006)
There are two central questions concerning probability. First, what are its formal features? That is a mathematical question, to which there is a standard, widely (though not universally) agreed upon answer. This answer is reviewed in the next section. Second, what sorts of things are probabilities---what, that is, is the subject matter of probability theory? This is a philosophical question, and while the mathematical theory of probability certainly bears on it, the answer must come from elsewhere. To see why, observe that there are many things in the world that have the mathematical structure of probabilities---the set of measurable regions on the surface of a table, for example---but that one would never mistake for being probabilities. So probability is distinguished by more than just its formal characteristics. The bulk of this essay will be taken up with the central question of what this “more” might be.
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Citations of this work BETA
Branden Fitelson (2006). The Paradox of Confirmation. Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113.
Haines Brown (2014). A Process Ontology. Axiomathes 24 (3):291-312.
Sahotra Sarkar & Thomas Uebel (2015). Introduction: Formal Epistemology and the Legacy of Logical Empiricism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:1-2.
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