David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 69 (4):611-622 (2002)
Naive deductive accounts of confirmation have the undesirable consequence that if E confirms H, then E also confirms the conjunction H & X, for any X—even if X is utterly irrelevant to H (and E). Bayesian accounts of confirmation also have this property (in the case of deductive evidence). Several Bayesians have attempted to soften the impact of this fact by arguing that—according to Bayesian accounts of confirmation— E will confirm the conjunction H & X less strongly than E confirms H (again, in the case of deductive evidence). I argue that existing Bayesian “resolutions” of this problem are inadequate in several important respects. In the end, I suggest a new‐and‐improved Bayesian account (and understanding) of the problem of irrelevant conjunction.
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Citations of this work BETA
Daniel Steel (2007). Bayesian Confirmation Theory and the Likelihood Principle. Synthese 156 (1):53 - 77.
J. Brian Pitts (2013). Irrelevant Conjunction and the Ratio Measure or Historical Skepticism. Synthese 190 (12):2117-2139.
Brian Laetz (2011). Does the Bayesian Solution to the Paradox of Confirmation Really Support Bayesianism? European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):39-46.
Branden Fitelson (2007). Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and Relational Confirmation. Synthese 156 (3):473 - 489.
Peter Brössel (2013). The Problem of Measure Sensitivity Redux. Philosophy of Science 80 (3):378-397.
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