Resolution for Intuitionistic Logic

Abstract
Most automated theorem provers have been built around some version of resolution [4]. But resolution is an inherently Classical logic technique. Attempts to extend the method to other logics have tended to obscure its simplicity. In this paper we present a resolution style theorem prover for Intuitionistic logic that, we believe, retains many of the attractive features of Classical resolution. It is, of course, more complicated, but the complications can be given intuitive motivation. We note that a small change in the system as presented here causes it to collapse back to a Classical resolution system. We present the system in some detail for the propositional case, including soundness and completeness proofs. For the first order version we are sketchier.
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    Grigori Mints (1993). Resolution Calculus for the First Order Linear Logic. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 2 (1):59-83.
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