Some Recent Fallacies of Approximation in Bayesian Confirmation Theory
| Abstract | • Several recent Bayesian discussions make use of “approximation” – Earman on the Quantitative Old Evidence Problem – Vranas on Quantitative Approaches to the Ravens Paradox – Dorling’s Quantitative Approach to Duhem–Quine – Strevens’s Quantitative Approach to Duhem–Quine – rThere are also examples not involving confirmation: E.g. | |||||||||
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