David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:293 - 303 (1982)
Several philosophers have argued that "temporal becoming" is mind-dependent, a claim they see as analogous to the traditional one about the mind-dependence of secondary qualities. They have tended to assume that the classical secondary qualities are mind-dependent, and also that the close analogue for time of directly experienced secondary qualities is an irreducibly indexical nowness. In an earlier article it was argued that we should reject the second assumption. Here it is shown why there is indeed a genuine problem of the ontological status of directly experienced temporality and spatiality, a problem analogous to the traditional one about secondary qualities.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Robert Pasnau (2006). A Theory of Secondary Qualities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):568-591.
Douglas Lewis (1970). Some Problems of Perceptions. Philosophy of Science 37 (March):100-113.
Robert A. Wilson (2016). Primary and Secondary Qualities. In Matthew Stuart (ed.), A Companion to Locke. Blackwell 193-211.
Robert Pasnau (2006). A Theory of Secondary Qualities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):568–591.
Robert Pasnau (2007). Democritus and Secondary Qualities. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 89 (2):99-121.
John Corvino (2008). Hume and the Second-Quality Analogy. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 6 (2):157-173.
Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2011). Are Colors Secondary Qualities? In Lawrence Nolan (ed.), Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate. Oxford University Press
G. F. Stout (1903). Primary and Secondary Qualities. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 4:141-160.
Nenad Miscevic (1997). Secondary and Tertiary Qualities: Semantics and Response--Dependence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (4):363-379.
Edwin McCann (2011). Locke's Distinction Between Primary Primary Qualities and Secondary Primary Qualities. In Lawrence Nolan (ed.), Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate. Oxford University Press
Jonathan Cohen (2010). Sounds and Temporality. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 5:303-320.
Emmett Holman (2006). Dualism and Secondary Quality Eliminativism. Philosophical Studies 128 (2):229--56.
Mi-Kyoung Lee (2011). The Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Qualities in Ancient Greek Philosophy. In Lawrence Nolan (ed.), Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate. Oxford University Press 15.
Antonia LoLordo (2011). Gassendi and the Seventeenth-Century Atomists on Primary and Secondary Qualities. In Lawrence Nolan (ed.), Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate. Oxford University Press
Added to index2011-05-29
Total downloads12 ( #357,405 of 1,941,041 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #272,533 of 1,941,041 )
How can I increase my downloads?