Acta Analytica 28 (3):345-352 (2013)
|Abstract||One way to discredit the suggestion that a statement is true just in virtue of its meaning is to observe that its truth is the subject of genuine disagreement. By appealing to the case of the unorthodox philosopher, Timothy Williamson has recast this response as an argument foreclosing any appeal to analyticity. Reconciling Quine’s epistemological holism with his treatment of the ‘deviant logician’, I show that we may discharge the demands of charitable interpretation even while attributing trivial semantic error to Williamson’s philosophers. Williamson’s effort to generalize the argument from disagreement therefore fails|
|Keywords||Analyticity Disagreement Epistemological holism Williamson, Timothy Quine, Willard Van Orman|
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