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- Owen J. Flanagan (1985). Consciousness, Naturalism and Nagel. Journal of Mind and Behavior 6:373-90.
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Does Derrida's radicalization of the science-respecting Enlightenment tradition redefine it in such a way that the concept of nature is no longer relevant? But where is the tradition of Copernicus, Darwin, Nietzsche, Marx, without nature? Must there not be a post-deconstructive sense of nature that preserves the connection with the ethico-political project of naturalism? Derrida consistently defines deconstruction in naturalistic terms, specifically in terms of a commitment to the concept of materiality, and this commitment is essential to the ethico-political project of naturalism, which is continually eroded by ‘weak’ naturalisms that at certain point collapse back into supernaturalism. A prime case in point in contemporary analytic philosophy is the attempt made by Nagel, Chalmers, and others to assign a special metaphysical status to ‘consciousness’ or ‘experience.’ When the project of deconstruction is seen as a form of naturalism, Daniel Dennett looms as an important potential ally against the forms of covert ‘spiritism’ represented by Nagel and Chalmers.
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