David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 83 (3):421 - 440 (2009)
Aquinas accepts that (i) some kinds of voluntary action are (qua voluntary) “basic,” not divisible into (non-fictional) further kinds; (ii) a concrete individual action may belong to more than one basic kind; (iii) the basic kinds to which it belongs are determined by the agent’s intentions qua performing the action; (iv) some intentions may stand to others as means to ends; (v) there can be concrete individual actions in which the agent’s intended means are disordered with respect to the ends; (vi) such actions are morally wrong; (vii) whether a given intention is disordered as means to a given end is determined solely by the natures of the agent and of the intended means or ends. Together, these propositions entail that, pace many analytic philosophers, concrete individual actions can have a moral wrongness that consists neither in expectation of disutility nor in violation of the pure logic of practical reason
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
John R. Searle (1979). The Intentionality of Intention and Action. Inquiry 22 (1-4):253 – 280.
Thomas Williams (2011). Human Freedom and Agency. In Brian Davies & Eleonore Stump (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas. Oxford University Press 199-208.
John Gibbons (2009). Reason in Action. In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press 72.
Anfinn Stigen (1970). The Concept of a Human Action. Inquiry 13 (1-4):1 – 31.
Stephen Andrew Butterfill (2001). Two Kinds of Purposive Action. European Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):141–165.
Hugh J. McCann (1972). Is Raising One's Arm a Basic Action? Journal of Philosophy 64 (9):235-249.
Daniel von Wachter (2011). Do the Results of Divine Actions Have Preceding Causes? European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (2):347-367.
Olle Blomberg (2011). Socially Extended Intentions-in-Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):335-353.
Tobias Hoffmann (2003). Moral Action as Human Action: End and Object in Aquinas in Comparison with Abelard, Lombard, Albert, and Scotus. The Thomist 67 (1):73–94.
Vere Chappell (2005). Self-Determination. In Christia Mercer (ed.), Early Modern Philosophy: Mind, Matter, and Metaphysics. Oxford University Press 127--41.
Paul Hoffman (2005). Aquinas on Threats and Temptations. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (2):225–242.
Joseph Pilsner (2006). The Specification of Human Actions in St. Thomas Aquinas. Oxford University Press.
Kenneth R. Westphal (1993). ‘The Basic Context and Structure of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’. In F. C. Beiser (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hegel. Cambridge
Matthew Noah Smith (2010). Practical Imagination and its Limits. Philosophers' Imprint 10 (3):1-20.
Added to index2011-12-01
Total downloads14 ( #184,535 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #231,316 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?