Abstract

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:245 THE MINDS OF DAVID HUME1 Providing a theoretical reduction of the mind to a collection of perceptions is one thing; providing merely a lawful description of mental phenomena is another. While the former requires the latter, it is possible to provide a lawful description of mental phenomena that leaves open the question of the nature of the mind. In this paper I shall argue that Hume's conceptual move from the science of man in the Treatise to the science of human nature in the Enquiries consists of a rejection of a theory of mind in favor of a lawful description, and this provides nonstylistic grounds for his 2 disavowal of the Treatise. 1. Meta-Theory One of Hume's tasks in the Treatise of Human Nature is to defend his bundle theory of mind. His stated objective in the Introduction to that work is to "explain the principles of human nature" (T xvi) and discover the "essence of the mind... from careful and exact experiments, and the observation of those particular effects, which result from its different circumstances and situations." (T xvii) In our examination of the Treatise, we shall find that there are systematic connections between his copy theory of ideas and his bundle theory of mind, and that the failure of the latter is sufficient to cast doubt on the former. The method Hume uses in constructing his theory of mind is "experimental," and he provides some remarks on the adequacy of such an experimental theory. It is with these that we shall begin. 246 Hume's meta-theoretical principles are of three kinds: principles governing the acceptability of theoretical terms, a principle of parsimony, and a principle of explanatory completeness. As we shall see, each of these kinds of principles is relevant to considerations of the acceptability and epistemic status of scientific theories. It is clear that Hume accepts an empiricist theory of meaning, and, therefore, that any theoretical terms one employs in a scientific or philosophical theory must have its meaning assigned on the basis of experience, (cf. T 17-25 and E 21-22) This is a minimal condition for the intelligibility of a theory. Although a commitment to an empiricist theory of meaning does not entail that one must be directly acquainted with theoretical objects, it does place several constraints upon the theoretical terms one uses. In his discussion of Spinozism, Hume spells out some of these constraints. In his words: I say then, that since we may suppose, but never conceive a specific difference betwixt an object and impression; any conclusion we form concerning the connexion and repugnance of impressions, will not be known certainly to be applicable to objects; but that on the other hand, whatever conclusions of this kind we form concerning objects, will most certainly be applicable to impressions. The reason is not difficult. As an object is suppos'd to be different from an impression, we cannot be sure, that the circumstance, upon which we found our reasoning, is common to both, supposing we form the reasoning upon the impression. 'Tis still possible, that the object may differ from it in that particular. But when we first form our reasoning concerning the object, 'tis beyond doubt, that the same reasoning must extend to the impression: And that because the 247 quality of the object, upon which the argument is founded, must at least be conceiv'd by the mind; and cou'd not be conceiv'd, unless it were common to an impression; since we have no idea but what is deriv'd from that origin. Thus we may establish it as a certain maxim, that we can never, by any principle, but by an irregular kind of reasoning from experience, discover a connexion or repugnance betwixt objects, which extends not to impressions; tho' the inverse proposition may not be equally true, that all the discoverable relations of impressions are common to objects. (T 241-242) Hume's empiricist theory of meaning places constraints upon the descriptions one can offer of theoretical objects. Although the objects in one's theory need not be immediately observable, they cannot be "specifically different" (different in kind) from impressions, i.e...