David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Princeton University Press (1999)
Taking the title of his book from Isaiah Berlin's famous essay distinguishing a negative concept of liberty connoting lack of interference by others from a positive concept involving participation in the political realm, Samuel Fleischacker explores a third definition of liberty that lies between the first two. In Fleischacker's view, Kant and Adam Smith think of liberty as a matter of acting on our capacity for judgment, thereby differing both from those who tie it to the satisfaction of our desires and those who translate it as action in accordance with reason or "will." Integrating the thought of Kant and Smith, and developing his own stand through readings of the Critique of Judgment and The Wealth of Nations, Fleischacker shows how different acting on one's best judgment is from acting on one's desires--how, in particular, good judgment, as opposed to mere desire, can flourish only in favorable social and political conditions. At the same time, exercising judgment is something every individual must do for him- or herself, hence not something that philosophers and politicians who reason better than the rest of us can do in our stead. For this reason advocates of a liberty based on judgment are likely to be more concerned than are libertarians to make sure that government provides people with conditions for the use of their liberty--for example, excellent standards of education, health care, and unemployment insurance--while at the same time promoting a less paternalistic view of government than most of the movements associated for the past thirty years with the political left.
|Keywords||Liberty Judgment (Ethics)|
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|Call number||JC181.K4.F58 1999|
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Citations of this work BETA
Jon Rick (2007). Hume's and Smith's Partial Sympathies and Impartial Stances. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 5 (2):135-158.
Joe Blosser (2013). Can God or the Market Set People Free? Journal of Religious Ethics 41 (2):233-253.
Avner Baz (2005). Kant's Principle of Purposiveness and the Missing Point of (Aesthetic) Judgements. Kantian Review 10 (1):1-32.
Maria A. Carrasco (2012). Adam Smith: Self-Command, Practical Reason and Deontological Insights. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (2):391-414.
Emily Brady (2011). Adam Smith's ''Sympathetic Imagination'' and the Aesthetic Appreciation of Environment. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 9 (1):95-109.
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