Brown and Moore's value invariabilism vs Dancy's variabilism
Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):162-168 (2010)
| Abstract | Campbell Brown has recently argued that G.E. Moore's intrinsic value holism is superior to Jonathan Dancy's. I show that the advantage which Brown claims for Moore's view over Dancy's is illusory, and that Dancy's view may be superior. | |||||||||
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