Brown and Moore's value invariabilism vs Dancy's variabilism

Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):162-168 (2010)
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Abstract

Campbell Brown has recently argued that G.E. Moore's intrinsic value holism is superior to Jonathan Dancy's. I show that the advantage which Brown claims for Moore's view over Dancy's is illusory, and that Dancy's view may be superior.

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Guy Fletcher
University of Edinburgh

Citations of this work

The Significance of Value Additivity.Campbell Brown - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2547-2570.
Holism about value: some help for invariabilists.Daniel Halliday - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1033-1046.
Mereological Dominance and Simpson’s Paradox.Tung-Ying Wu - 2020 - Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 48 (1):391–404.
Value Invariabilism and Two Distinctions in Value.Zak A. Kopeikin - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):45-63.

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References found in this work

The Conception of Intrinsic Value.G. E. Moore - 1998 - In James Rachels (ed.), Philosophical Studies. Oxford University Press.
The Conception of Intrinsic Value.G. E. Moore - 1998 - In James Rachels (ed.), Ethical Theory 1: The Question of Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
Two kinds of holism about values.Campbell Brown - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):456–463.

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