Egalitarianism and the Separateness of Persons

Utilitas 24 (3):381-398 (2012)
The difference between the unity of the individual and the separateness of persons requires that there be a shift in the moral weight that we accord to changes in utility when we move from making intrapersonal tradeoffs to making interpersonal tradeoffs. We examine which forms of egalitarianism can, and which cannot, account for this shift. We argue that a form of egalitarianism which is concerned only with the extent of outcome inequality cannot account for this shift. We also argue that a view which is concerned with both outcome inequality and with the unfairness of inequality in individuals‘ expected utilities can account for this shift. Finally, we limn an alternative view, on..
Keywords equality  separateness of persons  distributive ethics
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DOI 10.1017/S0953820812000040
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PhilPapers Archive Marc Fleurbaey, Egalitarianism and the Separateness of Persons
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References found in this work BETA
T. Nagel (1970). Possibility of Altruism. Princeton University Press.

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Matthew Rendall (2013). Priority and Desert. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):939-951.

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