Equal opportunity, reward and respect for preferences: Reply to Roemer

Economics and Philosophy 28 (2):201-216 (2012)
This rejoinder to Roemer examines Roemer's amendment to his EOp criterion, explains the similarities and differences between Roemer's approach to equality of opportunity and the economic literature inspired by the fair allocation theory, and proposes some clarifications on the compensation principle and the role of the reward principle in the definition of a responsibility-sensitive social criterion. It highlights the power of the ideal of respect for individual preferences with respect to the reward issue and the concern for potential harshness of the social criterion toward the individuals who fail to make good use of their opportunities. It discusses Roemer's objection against holding individuals responsible for their preferences.
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DOI 10.1017/S0266267112000168
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Ronald Dworkin (1981). What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources. Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (4):283 - 345.

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