Online research in philosophy

Address the problem of comparative law in the United States. Explains why comparative law matters. Gives reasons why U.S. lawyers are not learning from comparative law. These include lack of skills, lack of institutional supports, and legal structures that resist comparative law. and an attitude that comparative law has little to teach.

This article spans the fields of comparative and international law as it undertakes a comparative analysis of the character and nature of international law. In so doing, the article employs the new and dynamic scholarship associated with the study of the Mixed Jurisdictions of the world (those legal systems that comprise a mix of the common and civil law legal systems, such as Scotland, Louisiana, Quebec, South Africa and Israel). As international law increasingly searches for solutions to the problems associated with its new institutions and participants, the comparative analysis provided in this article will allow international law scholars to consider solutions already employed by the Mixed Jurisdictions.

I take it as obvious that attempts to justify the criminal law must be sensitive to matters of criminalization—to what conduct is proscribed or permitted. I discuss three additional matters that should be addressed in order to justify the criminal law. First, we must have a rough idea of what degree of deviation is tolerable between the set of criminal laws we ought to have and the set we really have. Second, we need information about how the criminal law at any given time and place is administered, since the law in action is bound to differ radically from the law on the books. Finally, we must have some basis for speculating what life would be like in the absence of a system of criminal justice—if the state ceased to impose punishments.

After an initial discussion (§i) of what a theory of criminal law might amount to, I sketch (§ii) the proper aims of a liberal, republican criminal law, and discuss (§§iii–iv) two central features of such a criminal law: that it deals with public wrongs, and provides for those who perpetrate such wrongs to be called to public account. §v explains why a liberal republic should maintain such a system of criminal law, and §vi tackles the issue of criminalization—of how we should determine the proper scope of the criminal law.

The specialised vocabularies of lawyers, ethicists, and political scientists obscure the roots of many real disagreements. In this book, the distinguished American international lawyer Alfred Rubin provides a penetrating account of where these roots lie, and argues powerfully that disagreements which have existed for 3,000 years are unlikely to be resolved soon. Current attempts to make 'war crimes' or 'terrorism' criminal under international law seem doomed to fail for the same reasons that attempts failed in the early nineteenth century to make piracy, war crimes, and the international traffic in slaves criminal under the law of nations. And for the same reasons, Professor Rubin argues, it is unlikely that an international criminal court can be instituted today to enforce ethicists' versions of 'international law'.

This book provides the first full account, explanation, and critique of extraterritorial punishment in international law.

In this paper I will argue that, international criminal law constitutes a valid legal system. There is skepticism over the authority of international law; some claim that it is not a genuine legal system, and does not command legal obligation. I will adopt a particular legal positivist position, known as moral attitude positivism, and apply this to an analysis of international criminal law. I will argue that the criteria necessary for a legal system on the positivist account are present in the international system of criminal law. Specifically, I will argue that a ‘rule of recognition’ can be drawn from a variation of the legal norm pacta sunt servanda, and this serves to validate the system as a whole. I conclude that the skeptic is wrong, and that international criminal law should be regarded as a valid legal system, commanding genuine legal authority.

International Criminal Law and Philosophy is the first anthology to bring together legal and philosophical theorists to examine the normative and conceptual foundations of international criminal law. In particular, through these essays the international group of authors addresses questions of state sovereignty; of groups, rather than individuals, as perpetrators and victims of international crimes; of international criminal law and the promotion of human rights and social justice; and of what comes after international criminal prosecutions, namely, punishment and reconciliation. International criminal law is still an emerging field, and as it continues to develop, the elucidation of clear, consistent theoretical groundings for its practices will be crucial. The questions raised and issues addressed by the essays in this volume will aid in this important endeavor.