Why it isn't syntax that unifies the proposition

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5-6):590-611 (2013)
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Abstract

King develops a syntax-based account of propositions based on the idea that propositional unity is grounded in the syntactic structure of the sentence. This account faces two objections: a Benacerraf objection and a grain-size objection. I argue that the syntax-based account survives both objections, as they have been put forward in the existing literature. I go on to show, however, that King equivocates between two distinct notions of ‘propositional structure ’ when explaining his account. Once the confusion is resolved, it is clear that the syntax-based account suffers from both Benacerraf and grain-size problems after all. I conclude by showing that King's account can be revised to avoid these problems, but only if it abandons its motivating idea that it is syntax that unifies the proposition

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Logan Fletcher
University of Maryland, College Park

Citations of this work

Propositions as Structured Cognitive Event‐Types.Wayne A. Davis - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):665-692.

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References found in this work

Frege’s Puzzle (2nd edition).Nathan U. Salmon - 1986 - Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company.
What numbers could not be.Paul Benacerraf - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):47-73.
The nature and structure of content.Jeffrey C. King - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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