David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Logic, Language and Information 17 (4):417-442 (2008)
Many social situations require a mental model of the knowledge, beliefs, goals, and intentions of others: a Theory of Mind (ToM). If a person can reason about other people’s beliefs about his own beliefs or intentions, he is demonstrating second-order ToM reasoning. A standard task to test second-order ToM reasoning is the second-order false belief task. A different approach to investigating ToM reasoning is through its application in a strategic game. Another task that is believed to involve the application of second-order ToM is the comprehension of sentences that the hearer can only understand by considering the speaker’s alternatives. In this study we tested 40 children between 8 and 10 years old and 27 adult controls on (adaptations of) the three tasks mentioned above: the false belief task, a strategic game, and a sentence comprehension task. The results show interesting differences between adults and children, between the three tasks, and between this study and previous research.
|Keywords||False belief Second-order reasoning Sentence comprehension Strategic game Theory of Mind|
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Citations of this work BETA
Rineke Verbrugge (2009). Logic and Social Cognition. Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (6):649 - 680.
Jun Zhang, Trey Hedden & Adrian Chia (2012). Perspective-Taking and Depth of Theory-of-Mind Reasoning in Sequential-Move Games. Cognitive Science 36 (3):560-573.
Bart Hollebrandse, Angeliek Hout & Petra Hendriks (2012). Children's First and Second-Order False-Belief Reasoning in a Verbal and a Low-Verbal Task. Synthese (3):1-13.
Bart Hollebrandse, Angeliek van Hout & Petra Hendriks (2012). Children's First and Second-Order False-Belief Reasoning in a Verbal and a Low-Verbal Task. Synthese 191 (3):1-13.
Maartje E. J. Raijmakers, Dorothy J. Mandell, Sara E. Es & Marian Counihan (2012). Children's Strategy Use When Playing Strategic Games. Synthese (3):1-16.
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