Epistemic Badness

Abstract
In this paper, I challenge Casey Swank’s claim that what makes epistemic vices bad are deeper personal vices and not anything specifically epistemic. I argue that epistemic vices are bad on account of a lack of a good epistemic motive. Consequently, the source of the badness is specifically epistemic. I develop my argument through a consideration of Aquinas’s accounts of wonder and presumption, namely that what makes the latter bad is the lack of something thatthe former possesses. I then analyze some representative epistemic virtues and vices in terms of the presence or privation of certain good epistemic motives. Finally, on the basis of the logic of the privation of something that should be present, I argue that a given vice’s lack of a good epistemic motive specifies the kind of badness present. In the case of an epistemic vice, then, the source of the problem is something specifically epistemic
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,360
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA
    Boudewijn de Bruin (2013). Epistemic Virtues in Business. Journal of Business Ethics 113 (4):583-595.
    Similar books and articles
    Jason Baehr (2010). Epistemic malevolence. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):189-213.
    J. Angelo Corlett (2008). Epistemic Responsibility. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):179 – 200.
    Chase B. Wrenn (2007). Why There Are No Epistemic Duties. Dialogue: The Canadian Philosophical Review 46 (01):115-136.
    Matthew Chrisman (2012). Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophy Compass 7 (2):118-126.
    Anthony Robert Booth (2012). Epistemic Ought is a Commensurable Ought. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2011-12-02

    Total downloads

    6 ( #162,909 of 1,088,810 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,735 of 1,088,810 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.