David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 167 (2):317 - 325 (2009)
The paper argues that the two best known formal logical fallacies, namely denying the antecedent (DA) and affirming the consequent (AC) are not just basic and simple errors, which prove human irrationality, but rather informational shortcuts, which may provide a quick and dirty way of extracting useful information from the environment. DA and AC are shown to be degraded versions of Bayes’ theorem, once this is stripped of some of its probabilities. The less the probabilities count, the closer these fallacies become to a reasoning that is not only informationally useful but also logically valid.
|Keywords||Affirming the consequent Bayes’ theorem Denying the antecedent Formal fallacies Rationality|
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References found in this work BETA
Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford (eds.) (2008). The Probabilistic Mind: Prospects for Bayesian Cognitive Science. Oup Oxford.
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Ulrike Hahn & Mike Oaksford (2006). A Bayesian Approach to Informal Argument Fallacies. Synthese 152 (2):207 - 236.
C. L. Hamblin (1970/1993). Fallacies. Vale Press.
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