Prosa versus Demonstração: Wittgenstein sobre Gödel, Tarski e a Verdade
Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 58 (3):605 - 632 (2002)
| Abstract | O presente artigo procede, em primeiro lugar, a um exame das evidências disponíveis referentes à atitude de Wittgenstein em relação ao, bem como conhecimento do, primeiro teorema da incompletude de Gödel, incluindo as suas discussões com Turing, Watson e outros em 1937-1939, e o testemunho posterior de Goodstein e Kreisel Em segundo lugar, o artigo discute a importância filosófica e histórica da atitude de Wittgenstein em relação ao teorema de Gödel e outros teoremas da lógica matemática, contrastando esta atitude com a de, por exemplo, Penrose. Finalmente, a autora responde também a criticas instrutivas feitas por Mark Steiner a um artigo seu publicado em 1995, as quais estabelecem a importância do trabalho semântico de Tarski, quer para o nosso entendimento das observacoes de Wittgenstein. /// This paper presents, first, a survey of current evidence available concerning Wittgenstein's attitude toward, and knowledge of, Gödel's first incompleteness theorem, including his discussions with Turing, Watson and others in 1937-1939, and later testimony of Goodstein and Kreisel Secondly, the article discusses the philosophical and historical importance of Wittgenstein's attitude toward Gödal's and other theorems in mathematical logic, contrasting this attitude with that of, e. g., Penrose. Finally, the author also replies to an instructive criticism of her 1995 paper by Mark Steiner which assesses the importance ofTarskih semantical work, both for our understanding of Wittgenstein's remarks on Godel, and our understanding ofGodeVs theorem itself. | |||||||||
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