Prose versus proof: Wittgenstein on gödel, Tarski and Truth

Philosophia Mathematica 9 (3):280-307 (2001)
A survey of current evidence available concerning Wittgenstein's attitude toward, and knowledge of, Gödel's first incompleteness theorem, including his discussions with Turing, Watson and others in 1937–1939, and later testimony of Goodstein and Kreisel; 2) Discussion of the philosophical and historical importance of Wittgenstein's attitude toward Gödel's and other theorems in mathematical logic, contrasting this attitude with that of, e.g., Penrose; 3) Replies to an instructive criticism of my 1995 paper by Mark Steiner which assesses the importance of Tarski's semantical work, both for our understanding of Wittgenstein's remarks on Gödel, and our understanding of Gödel's theorem itself.
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DOI 10.1093/philmat/9.3.280
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