David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Behavioral Brain Research 71:157-61 (1995)
A hypothesis on the physiological conditions of consciousness is presented. It is assumed that the occurrence of states of consciousness causally depends on the formation of complex representational structures. Cortical neural networks that exhibit a high representational activity develop higher-order, self-referential representations as a result of self-organizing processes. The occurrence of such states is identical with the appearance of states of consciousness. The underlying physiological processes can be identified. It is assumed that neural assemblies instantiate mental representations; hence consciousness depends on the rate at which large active assemblies are generated. The formation of assemblies involves the activation of the N-methyl-D-aspartate receptor channel complex which controls different forms of synaptic plasticity including rapid changes of the connection strengths. The various causes of unconsciousness (e.g., anaesthetics or brain stem lesions) have a common denominator: they directly or indirectly inhibit the formation of assemblies
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Citations of this work BETA
E. Roy John (2001). A Field Theory of Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (2):184-213.
Uriah Kriegel (2007). A Cross-Order Integration Hypothesis for the Neural Correlate of Consciousness. Consciousness & Cognition 16 (4):897-912.
Nancy J. Woolf (1997). A Possible Role for Cholinergic Neurons of the Basal Forebrain and Pontomesencephalon in Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 6 (4):574-596.
Frederic Peters (2014). Accounting for Consciousness: Epistemic and Operational Issues. Axiomathes 24 (4):441-461.
Uriah Kriegel (2007). A Cross-Order Integration Hypothesis for the Neural Correlate of Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (4):897-912.
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