Set Theory, Type Theory, and Absolute Generality

Mind 123 (489):157-174 (2014)
Abstract
In light of the close connection between the ontological hierarchy of set theory and the ideological hierarchy of type theory, Øystein Linnebo and Agustín Rayo have recently offered an argument in favour of the view that the set-theoretic universe is open-ended. In this paper, we argue that, since the connection between the two hierarchies is indeed tight, any philosophical conclusions cut both ways. One should either hold that both the ontological hierarchy and the ideological hierarchy are open-ended, or that neither is. If there is reason to accept the view that the set-theoretic universe is open-ended, that will be because such a view is the most compelling one to adopt on the purely ontological front
Keywords set theory  type theory  unrestricted quantification  plural quantification
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Similar books and articles
Agustin Rayo (2006). Beyond Plurals. In Agustín Rayo & Gabriel Uzquiano (eds.), Absolute Generality. Oxford University Press. 220--54.
Øystein Linnebo (2006). Sets, Properties, and Unrestricted Quantification. In Gabriel Uzquiano & Agustin Rayo (eds.), Absolute Generality. Oxford University Press.
Øystein Linnebo, Plural Quantification. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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