Do we really want a moral justification of our basic ideals?

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 17 (1-4):151 – 173 (1974)
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Abstract

It is commonly held that when there is a conflict of basic ideals, e.g. a humane man v. an elitist or a Social Darwinist or someone who holds a revenge ethic, no moral justification is possible. This paper attempts to go further and show that such a justification would be undesirable, would carry a price few would be willing to pay. The thesis is developed to shed light not only on classical thinkers (Plato, Locke, Kant) but also on the attractions of naturalism and intuitionism - and to suggest the need for a non-moral approach to justification, an approach emphasizing appeals to logic, self-interest, and personal happiness.

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