Online research in philosophy

Blair proposes that fluid intelligence, working memory, and executive function form a unitary construct: fluid cognition. Recently, our group has utilized a combined correlational–experimental cognitive neuroscience approach, which we argue is beneficial for investigating relationships among these individual differences in terms of neural mechanisms underlying them. Our data do not completely support Blair's strong position. (Published Online April 5 2006).

A problem with Stanovich & West's inference that there a nonintellectual processing system independent from an intellectual one from data in which they partialled out global intelligence is that they may have controlled for the wrong kind of intellectual intelligence. Research on cognitive-experiential self-theory over the past two decades provides much stronger support for two independent processing systems.

A fundamental problem in artificial intelligence is that nobody really knows what intelligence is. The problem is especially acute when we need to consider artificial systems which are significantly different to humans. In this paper we approach this problem in the following way: we take a number of well known informal definitions of human intelligence that have been given by experts, and extract their essential features. These are then mathematically formalised to produce a general measure of intelligence for arbitrary machines. We believe that this equation formally captures the concept of machine intelligence in the broadest reasonable sense. We then show how this formal definition is related to the theory of universal optimal learning agents. Finally, we survey the many other tests and definitions of intelligence that have been proposed for machines.

Although working memory capacity and executive function contribute to human intelligence, we question whether there is an equivalence between them and fluid intelligence. We contend that any satisfactory neurobiological explanation of fluid intelligence needs to include abstraction as an important computational component of brain processing. (Published Online April 5 2006).

The question of whether fluid intelligence can be differentiated from general intelligence in older adults is addressed. Data indicate that the developmental pattern of performance on fluid tasks differs from the pattern of general intelligence. These results suggest that it is important to identify changes in fluid cognitive functions associated with frontal lobe decline, as they may be early indicators of cognitive decline. (Published Online April 5 2006).

Primary issues raised by the commentaries on the target article relate to (1) the need to differentiate distinct but overlapping aspects of fluid cognition, and (2) the implications that this differentiation may hold for conceptions of general intelligence. In response, I outline several issues facing researchers concerned with differentiation of human cognitive abilities and suggest that a revised and expanded theory of intelligence is needed to accommodate an increasingly diverse and varied empirical base. (Published Online April 5 2006).

Although I find Blair's case for arguing for the distinction between fluid cognitive functions and general intelligence less than compelling, I believe him. However, I also believe that what is required next is a theory of both general intelligence and fluid cognitive functions that articulates the distinction. In the absence of this, more data, particularly of the neuroscience variety, is likely to stall rather than advance progress. (Published Online April 5 2006).

In this article I develop a case for a theory of intelligence incorporating transpersonal dimensions, namely integrated intelligence. Some recent expanded theories of intelligence move into concepts like creativity, wisdom, and emotional intelligence. Yet they remain embedded within mainstream intelligence theory and its reductionist and materialist presuppositions. Although various theorists in consciousness theory have developed transpersonal models that are beginning to be discussed in some mainstream circles, mainstream intelligence theory is yet to address the broader implications of this. Recent changes in the global economy and the needs of populations have created a need for an expanded theory of intelligence, and more intuitive thinking.

We welcome Blair's argument that the relationship between fluid cognition and other aspects of intelligence should be an important focus of research, but are less convinced by his arguments that fluid intelligence is dissociable from general intelligence. This is due to confusions between (a) crystallized skills and g, and (b) universal and differential constructs. (Published Online April 5 2006).

Blair's assertion that fluid intelligence (gF) is distinct from general intelligence (g) is contradictory to cumulative evidence from intelligence research, including extant and novel evidence about generational IQ gains (Lynn–Flynn effect). Because of the near unity of gF and g, his hypothetical concept of gF' (gF “purged” of g variance) may well be a phlogiston theory. (Published Online April 5 2006).