Connectionism and the problem of systematicity (continued): Why Smolensky's solution still doesn't work
Cognition 62:109-19 (1997)
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| Keywords | Connectionism Psychology Smolensky, P | |||||||||
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Robert J. Matthews (1997). Can Connectionists Explain Systematicity? Mind and Language 12 (2):154-77.
Paul Smolensky (1995). Constituent Structure and Explanation in an Integrated Connectionist/Symbolic Cognitive Architecture. In C. Macdonald (ed.), Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Blackwell.
Paul Smolensky (1995). On the Projectable Predicates of Connectionist Psychology: A Case for Belief. In C. Macdonald & Graham F. Macdonald (eds.), Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Blackwell.
Jay F. Rosenberg (1990). Treating Connectionism Properly: Reflections on Smolensky. Psychological Research 52.
Brian P. McLaughlin (1993). The Connectionism/Classicism Battle to Win Souls. Philosophical Studies 71 (2):163-190.
Paul Smolensky (1988). On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11:1-23.
Jay L. Garfield (1997). Mentalese Not Spoken Here: Computation, Cognition, and Causation. Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):413-35.
Paul Smolensky (1991). Connectionism, Constituency and the Language of Thought. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.
Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (1995). Reply to Clark and Smolensky: Do Connectionist Minds Have Beliefs? In C. Macdonald & Graham F. Macdonald (eds.), Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Blackwell.
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