David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (1998)
The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory on the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of rival theories, and suggests that future work on human cognition should build upon new foundations. This lively, conversational, and superbly accessible book is the first volume in the Oxford Cognitive Science Series, where the best original work in this field will be presented to a broad readership. Concepts will fascinate anyone interested in contemporary work on mind and language. Cognitive science will never be the same again
|Keywords||Cognitive Science Concept Language Naturalism Science|
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|Call number||BD418.3.F62 1998|
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Citations of this work BETA
Susanna Schellenberg (2010). The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 149 (1):19 - 48.
Susanna Schellenberg (2011). Ontological Minimalism About Phenomenology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.
Stephen Stich (2013). Do Different Groups Have Different Epistemic Intuitions? A Reply to Jennifer Nagel1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):151-178.
Jonathan Ichikawa & Benjamin Jarvis (2009). Thought-Experiment Intuitions and Truth in Fiction. Philosophical Studies 142 (2):221 - 246.
Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Is Intuition Based On Understanding? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):42-67.
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