Having concepts: A brief refutation of the twentieth century

Mind and Language 19 (1):29-47 (2004)
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Abstract

A certain ‘pragmatist’ view of concept possession has defined the mainstream of Anglophone philosophy of language/mind for decades: namely, that to have the concept C is to be able to distinguish Cs from non‐Cs, and/or to recognize the validity of certain C‐involving inferences. The present paper offers three arguments why no such account could be viable. An alternative ‘Cartesian’ view is outlined, according to which having C is being able to think about Cs ‘as such’. Some consequences of the proposed paradigm shift are briefly considered.

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References found in this work

The Compositionality Papers.Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest LePore (eds.) - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
Analyticity.Paul Artin Boghossian - 1996 - In B. Hale & C. Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell. pp. 331-368.

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