It Does So [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
AI Magazine 22 (4):141-144 (2001)
Objections to AI and computational cognitive science are myriad. Accordingly, there are many different reasons for these attacks. But all of them come down to one simple observation: humans seem a lot smarter that computers -- not just smarter as in Einstein was smarter than I, or I am smarter than a chimpanzee, but more like I am smarter than a pencil sharpener. To many, computation seems like the wrong paradigm for studying the mind. (Actually, I think there are deeper and darker reasons why AI, especially, is so often the brunt of polemics, see Dietrich, 2000.) But the truth is this: AI is making exciting progress, and will one day make a robot as intelligent as a person; indeed the robot will be conscious. And all this is because of another truth: the computational paradigm is the best thing to come down the pike since the wheel.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Eric Dietrich (2008). Some Strangeness in the Proportion, or How to Stop Worrying and Learn to Love the Mechanistic Forces of Darkness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (3):349-352.
Similar books and articles
Eric Dietrich (2001). It Does So: Review of Jerry Fodor, The Mind Doesn't Work That Way. [REVIEW] AI Magazine 22 (4):121-24.
Eric Dietrich (2001). It Does So: Review of The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology. [REVIEW] AI Magazine 22 (4):141-144.
Richard Adams (2004). Intelligent Advertising. AI and Society 18 (1):68-81.
Susan Hurley (2005). Social Heuristics That Make Us Smarter. Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):585 – 612.
Jerome Dodson (1994). Smarter Money. Business Ethics 8 (2):41-41.
Dominec Colasacco (1994). Smarter Money. Business Ethics 8 (3):41-41.
Hugo Mercier (2013). Our Pigheaded Core: How We Became Smarter to Be Influenced by Other People. In Kim Sterelny, Richard Joyce, Brett Calcott & Ben Fraser (eds.), Cooperation and its Evolution. MIT Press 373.
Austen Clark (2006). Attention & Inscrutability: A Commentary on John Campbell, Reference and Consciousness for the Pacific APA Meeting, Pasadena, California, 2004. Philosophical Studies 127 (2):167-193.
Eric Dietrich (1989). Semantics and the Computational Paradigm in Computational Psychology. Synthese 79 (April):119-41.
Lisa Bortolotti (2009). Do We Have an Obligation to Make Smarter Babies? In T. Takala, P. Herrisone-Kelly & S. Holm (eds.), Cutting Through the Surface. Philosophical Approaches to Bioethics. Rodopi
Added to index2010-12-22
Total downloads204 ( #15,567 of 1,911,519 )
Recent downloads (6 months)17 ( #36,656 of 1,911,519 )
How can I increase my downloads?