Observation reconsidered

Philosophy of Science 51 (March):23-43 (1984)
Several arguments are considered which purport to demonstrate the impossibility of theory-neutral observation. The most important of these infers the continuity of observation with theory from the presumed continuity of perception with cognition, a doctrine widely espoused in recent cognitive psychology. An alternative psychological account of the relation between cognition and perception is proposed and its epistemological consequences for the observation/theory distinction are then explored.
Keywords Epistemology  Inference  Observation  Perception
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DOI 10.1086/289162
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Jerry A. Fodor (1985). Precis of the Modularity of Mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):1-42.

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