David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):1-42 (1985)
The Modularity of Mind proposes an alternative to the or view of cognitive architecture that has dominated several decades of cognitive science. Whereas interactionism stresses the continuity of perceptual and cognitive processes, modularity theory argues for their distinctness. It is argued, in particular, that the apparent plausibility of New Look theorizing derives from the failure to distinguish between the (correct) claim that perceptual processes are inferential and the (dubious) claim that they are unencapsidated, that is, that they are arbitrarily sensitive to the organism's beliefs and desires. In fact, according to modularity theory, perceptual processes are computationally isolated from much of the background knowledge to which cognitive processes have access. The postulation of autonomous, domain-specific psychological mechanisms underlying perceptual integration connects modularity theory with the tradition of faculty psychology, in particular, with the work of Franz Joseph Call. Some of these historical affinities, and some of the relations between faculty psychology and Cartesianism, are discussed in the book
|Keywords||Cartesianism cognition faculty psychology interactionism language modularity neuropsychology perception phrenology|
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References found in this work BETA
Noam A. Chomsky (1980). Rules and Representations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (127):1-61.
Jerry A. Fodor (1984). Observation Reconsidered. Philosophy of Science 51 (March):23-43.
Jerry A. Fodor (1981). Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. Mit Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Dustin Stokes (2012). Perceiving and Desiring: A New Look at the Cognitive Penetrability of Experience. Philosophical Studies 158 (3):479-92.
John M. Doris (2010). Heated Agreement: Lack of Character as Being for the Good. Philosophical Studies 148 (1):135-146.
Matthew J. Rellihan (2009). Fodor's Riddle of Abduction. Philosophical Studies 144 (2):313 - 338.
Nils-Eric Sahlin, Annika Wallin & Johannes Persson (2010). Decision Science: From Ramsey to Dual Process Theories. Synthese 172 (1):129 - 143.
Bongrae Seok (2006). Diversity and Unity of Modularity. Cognitive Science 30 (2):347-380.
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