David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Issues 3 (4):15-35 (1993)
It's an achievement of the last couple of decades that people who work in linguistic semantics and people who work in the philosophy of language have arrived at a friendly, de facto agreement as to their respective job descriptions. The terms of this agreement are that the semanticists do the work and the philosophers do the worrying. The semanticists try to construct actual theories of meaning (or truth theories, or model theories, or whatever) for one or another kind of expression in one or another natural language; for example, they try to figure out how the temperature could be rising compatibly with the substitutivity of identicals. The philosophers, by contrast, keep an eye on the large, foundational issues, such as: what's the relation between sense and denotation; what's the relation between thought and language; whether translation is determinate; and whether life is like a fountain. Every now and then the philosophers and the semanticists are supposed to get together and compare notes on their respective progress. Or lack thereof
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Joshua Schechter & David Enoch (2006). Meaning and Justification: The Case of Modus Ponens. Noûs 40 (4):687 - 715.
Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest LePore (1993). Reply to Block and Boghossian. Mind and Language 8 (1):41-48.
Nicholas Georgalis, Ashwin Ram, Eric K. Jones, J. Angelo Corlett, Carol Slater, C. U. M. Smith & Dorit Bar‐On (1995). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 8 (2):189-212.
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