Philosophical Issues 3 (4):15-35 (1993)
|Abstract||It's an achievement of the last couple of decades that people who work in linguistic semantics and people who work in the philosophy of language have arrived at a friendly, de facto agreement as to their respective job descriptions. The terms of this agreement are that the semanticists do the work and the philosophers do the worrying. The semanticists try to construct actual theories of meaning (or truth theories, or model theories, or whatever) for one or another kind of expression in one or another natural language; for example, they try to figure out how the temperature could be rising compatibly with the substitutivity of identicals. The philosophers, by contrast, keep an eye on the large, foundational issues, such as: what's the relation between sense and denotation; what's the relation between thought and language; whether translation is determinate; and whether life is like a fountain. Every now and then the philosophers and the semanticists are supposed to get together and compare notes on their respective progress. Or lack thereof|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Harold I. Brown (1986). Sellars, Concepts, and Conceptual Change. Synthese 68 (August):275-307.
Ralph Wedgwood (2001). Conceptual Role Semantics for Moral Terms. Philosophical Review 110 (1):1-30.
Mark Perlman (1997). The Trouble with Two-Factor Conceptual Role Theories. Minds and Machines 7 (4):495-513.
Hartry Field (1977). Logic, Meaning, and Conceptual Role. Journal of Philosophy 74 (July):379-409.
Ernest Lepore & Jerry Fodor (2010). Why Meaning (Probably) Isn't Conceptual Role. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing About Language. Routledge.
Ron Wilburn (2003). Knowledge, Content and the Wellsprings of Objectivity. In Preyer Gerhard, Peter Georg & Ulkan Maria (eds.), Concepts of Meaning: Framing an Integrated Theory of Linguistic Behaviour (Philosophical Studies series volume 92). Klewer Academic Publishers.
Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest LePore (1991). Why Meaning (Probably) Isn't Conceptual Role. Mind and Language 6 (4):328-43.
Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.) (2007). John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind. Cambridge University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads49 ( #21,706 of 548,984 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,729 of 548,984 )
How can I increase my downloads?