David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Analysis 58 (4):286–289 (1998)
David Lewis has argued that there must be a difference between indicative and counterfactual conditionals beyond an indication of truth-value commitments. He cites the following contrast to show this: If Oswald did not shoot Kennedy, then someone else did. If Oswald had not shot Kennedy, then someone else would have. In response, it is shown that this difference is better explained by shifts in context. Keep context fixed, the contrast disappears. EG: If Oswald was not the one who shot Kennedy, then someone else was. If Oswald had not been the one who shot Kennedy, then someone else would have been
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Xavier Donato Rodríguez & Alfonso Arroyo Santos (2012). The Structure of Idealization in Biological Theories: The Case of the Wright-Fisher Model. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science 43 (1):11-27.
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