Graduate studies at Western
Analysis 58 (4):286–289 (1998)
|Abstract||David Lewis has argued that there must be a difference between indicative and counterfactual conditionals beyond an indication of truth-value commitments. He cites the following contrast to show this: If Oswald did not shoot Kennedy, then someone else did. If Oswald had not shot Kennedy, then someone else would have. In response, it is shown that this difference is better explained by shifts in context. Keep context fixed, the contrast disappears. EG: If Oswald was not the one who shot Kennedy, then someone else was. If Oswald had not been the one who shot Kennedy, then someone else would have been|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Brian Weatherson (2001). Indicative and Subjunctive Conditionals. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):200-216.
David K. Lewis (1983). Philosophical Papers. Oxford University Press.
Daniel Rothschild (2013). Do Indicative Conditionals Express Propositions? Noûs 47 (1):49-68.
Daniel Nolan (2003). Defending a Possible-Worlds Account of Indicative Conditionals. Philosophical Studies 116 (3):215-269.
Frank Jackson (ed.) (1991). Conditionals. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads20 ( #68,333 of 739,489 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,288 of 739,489 )
How can I increase my downloads?