Garrett on the Consistency of Hume's Philosophy

Hume Studies 24 (1):161-169 (1998)
Abstract
In _Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy, Don Garrett argues for the coherence of Hume's philosophy when it is viewed as work in cognitive psychology. Without denying this, I argue that there is more to Hume's standpoint than cognitive psychology. Specifically, Hume's standpoint shifts as the level of inquiry changes. A descriptive cognitive psychology is one standpoint that he occupies. However, he occupies other standpoints as well: the commonsense standpoint of the vulgar is one; the radical doubt of the skeptic is another. Such a radical perspectivism is central to Hume's writings
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Citations of this work BETA
Jani Hakkarainen (2012). Why Hume Cannot Be A Realist. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 10 (2):143-161.
Jani Hakkarainen (2012). Hume's Scepticism and Realism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (2):283-309.
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Don Garrett (2000). Hume's Defence of Causal Inference (Review). Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (1):126-128.
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