|Abstract||In what follows, I will be making recommendations for how to understand and distinguish these three concepts. The account I will be developing situates the concept of epistemically rational belief into a well-integrated and philosophically respectable general theory of rationality; it links the concept of warranted belief with the theory of knowledge; and it insists that the concept of justified belief should be relevant to the assessments of each other’s beliefs that we are most interested in making in our everyday lives, namely, assessments where the focus is not so much on whether one has fulfilled all the prerequisites of knowledge but rather on whether one has been a responsible believer.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Richard Foley (1993). Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
David Henderson & Terence E. Horgan (2001). Practicing Safe Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 102 (3):227 - 258.
Alvin Plantinga (2001). Rationality and Public Evidence: A Reply to Richard Swinburne. Religious Studies 37 (2):215-222.
Michael Bergmann (2006). Epistemic Circularity and Common Sense: A Reply to Reed. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):198–207.
E. J. Coffman (2013). Problems for Foley's Accounts of Rational Belief and Responsible Belief. Res Philosophica 90 (2):147-160.
Ralph Wedgwood (2008). Contextualism About Justified Belief. Philosophers' Imprint 8 (9):1-20.
Anthony Robert Booth & Rik Peels (2010). Why Responsible Belief is Blameless Belief. Journal of Philosophy 107 (5):257-265.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads89 ( #9,836 of 722,698 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #36,273 of 722,698 )
How can I increase my downloads?