Laudan's Model of Axiological Change and the Bohr-Einstein Debate

Abstract
According to the naturalistic normative axiology of Laudan's reticulated model of scientific change, empirical discoveries in the advance of science can provide a rational basis for axiological decisions concerning which epistemic goals scientific inquiry ought to pursue. The Bohr-Einstein debate over acceptance of quantum theory is analyzed as a case of axiological change. The participants' aims are incompatible due to different formulations of the goal of objective description, but neither doubts the realist commitment to the existence of microsystems or the intention of quantum mechanics to provide knowledge of them. Thus the general aim of realism is not at issue.
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