David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (1993)
In this new book, Foley defends an epistemology that takes seriously the perspectives of individual thinkers. He argues that having rational opinions is a matter of meeting our own internal standards rather than standards that are somehow imposed upon us from the outside. It is a matter of making ourselves invulnerable to intellectual self-criticism. Foley also shows how the theory of rational belief is part of a general theory of rationality. He thus avoids treating the rationality of belief as a fundamentally different kind of phenomenon from the rationality of decision or action. His approach generates promising suggestions about a wide range of issues--e.g., the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic reasons for belief; the question of what aspects of the Cartesian project are still worth doing; the significance of simplicity and other theoretical virtues; the relevance of skeptical hypotheses; the difference between a theory of rational belief and a theory of knowledge; the difference between a theory of rational belief and a theory of rational degrees of belief; and the limits of idealization in epistemology.
|Keywords||Knowledge, Theory of|
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|Buy the book||$29.99 used (77% off) $70.15 new (47% off) $118.72 direct from Amazon (9% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BD161.F58 1993|
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Citations of this work BETA
Clayton Littlejohn (2010). Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100.
Martin Smith (2010). What Else Justification Could Be. Noûs 44 (1):10 - 31.
Thomas Kelly (2003). Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.
Declan Smithies (2012). The Normative Role of Knowledge. Noûs 46 (2):265-288.
Jennifer Nagel (2010). Epistemic Anxiety and Adaptive Invariantism. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):407-435.
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