David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In G. Romano & Malatesti (eds.), From an Ontological Point of View, Swif Philosophy of Mind Review, Symposium. Swif Philosophy of Mind Review (2007)
In this paper I argue that the requirement for the qualitative is theory-dependent, determined by the fundamental assumptions built into the ontology. John Heil’s qualitative, in its role as individuator of objects and powers, is required only by a theory that posits a world of distinct objects or powers. Does Heil’s ‘deep’ view of the world, such that there is only one powerful object require the qualitative as individuator of objects and powers? The answer depends on whether it is possible to account for the manifest objects and the ostensible spatial primacy of our perceived world without recourse to the qualitative. In this paper I outline just such an account with the intention of extending Heil’s efforts to incorporate fundamental power in the world while providing a coherent explanation for our strong intuition of spatial, as against relational, priority
|Keywords||powers categorical properties dispositional properties qualitative properties Heil, John individuation|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Robert Schroer (2010). How Far Can the Physical Sciences Reach? American Philosophical Quarterlly 47 (3):253-266.
Sharon R. Ford (2010). What Fundamental Properties Suffice to Account for the Manifest World? Powerful Structure. Dissertation, University of Queensland
John Heil (2003). From an Ontological Point of View. Oxford University Press.
Vera Hoffmann (2006). Can Heil's Ontological Conception Accommodate Complex Properties? In Michael Esfeld (ed.), John Heil. Symposium on his Ontological Point of View. ontos verlag.
John H. Taylor (2013). In Defence of Powerful Qualities. Metaphysica 14 (1):93-107.
Michael Esfeld (2006). From Being Ontologically Serious to Serious Ontology. In , John Heil: Symposium on His Ontological Point of View. Ontos. 191--206.
Brian Ellis (2010). Causal Powers and Categorical Properties. In Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations. Routledge.
Sharon R. Ford (2012). The Categorical-Dispositional Distinction. In Alexander Bird, Brian Ellis & Howard Sankey (eds.), Properties, Powers and Structures: Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism. Routledge.
Sharon R. Ford (2011). Deriving the Manifestly Qualitative World From a Pure-Power Base: Light-Like Networks. Philosophia Scientiae 15 (3):155-175.
Brandon N. Towl (2010). The Individuation of Causal Powers by Events (and Consequences of the Approach). Metaphysica 11 (1):49-61.
Robert Schroer (2010). Is There More Than One Categorical Property? Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241):831-850.
Robert Schroer (2013). Can a Single Property Be Both Dispositional and Categorical? The “Partial Consideration Strategy”, Partially Considered. Metaphysica 14 (1):63-77.
David M. Armstrong (2005). Four Disputes About Properties. Synthese 144 (3):1-12.
Added to index2012-07-03
Total downloads16 ( #113,476 of 1,413,180 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #35,115 of 1,413,180 )
How can I increase my downloads?