A Philosopher's Guide to Empirical Success

Philosophy of Science 74 (5):588-600 (2007)
Abstract
The simple question, what is empirical success? turns out to have a surprisingly complicated answer. We need to distinguish between meritorious fit and ‘fudged fit', which is akin to the distinction between prediction and accommodation. The final proposal is that empirical success emerges in a theory dependent way from the agreement of independent measurements of theoretically postulated quantities. Implications for realism and Bayesianism are discussed. ‡This paper was written when I was a visiting fellow at the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh; I thank everyone for their support. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 5185 Helen C. White Hall, 600 North Park Street, Madison, WI 53706; e-mail: mforster@wisc.edu.
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References found in this work BETA
Malcolm R. Forster (2002). Predictive Accuracy as an Achievable Goal of Science. Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):S124-S134.

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Citations of this work BETA
Jan Sprenger (2013). The Role of Bayesian Philosophy Within Bayesian Model Selection. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (1):101-114.
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