Acta Analytica 14 (23.):89-99. (1999)
|Abstract||The paper seeks to show that Quine’s theses concerning the underdetermination of scientific theories by experience and the indeterminacy of reference cannot be reconciled if some of Quine’s central assumptions are accepted. The argument is this. Quine holds that the thesis about reference is not just a special case of the other thesis. In order to make sense of this comment we must distinguish between factual and epistemic indeterminacy. Something is factual indeterminate if it is not determined by the facts. Epistemic indeterminacy, on the other hand, is due to the lack of evidence. Quine’s claim about the relationship between the two theses is best understood as saying that reference is factually indeterminate, whereas the underdetermination of scientific theories is merely epistemic. But the latter cannot be sustained in light of Quine’s verificationism, holism and naturalism.|
|Keywords||indeterminacy of reference underdetermination of scientific theories holism verificationism naturalism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|External links||This entry has no external links. Add one.|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Ian McDiarmid (2008). Underdetermination and Meaning Indeterminacy: What is the Difference? [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 69 (3):279 - 293.
Juan José Lara (2009). Underdetermination Vs. Indeterminacy. Daimon 47:219-228.
Otávio Bueno (2003). Quine's Double Standard: Undermining the Indispensability Argument Via the Indeterminacy of Reference. Principia 7 (1-2):17-39.
Itay Shani (2005). Intension and Representation: Quine's Indeterminacy Thesis Revisited. Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):415 – 440.
A. W. Moore (1997). The Underdetermination/Indeterminacy Distinction and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction. Erkenntnis 46 (1):5-32.
Donald Hockney (1975). The Bifurcation of Scientific Theories and Indeterminacy of Translation. Philosophy of Science 42 (4):411-427.
J. E. Malpas (1989). Ontological Relativity in Quine and Davidson. Grazer Philosophische Studien 36:157-178.
Philip L. Peterson (1984). Semantic Indeterminacy and Scientific Underdetermination. Philosophy of Science 51 (3):464-487.
Christian Nimtz (2005). Reassessing Referential Indeterminacy. Erkenntnis 62 (1):1 - 28.
Roger F. Gibson (1986). Quine's Dilemma. Synthese 69 (1):27 - 39.
Günter Abel (1994). Indeterminacy and Interpretation. Inquiry 37 (4):403 – 419.
Roger F. Gibson (ed.) (2004). The Cambridge Companion to Quine. Cambridge University Press.
Joseph Rouse (1991). Indeterminacy, Empirical Evidence, and Methodological Pluralism. Synthese 86 (3):443 - 465.
P. William Bechtel (1980). Indeterminacy and Underdetermination: Are Quine's Two Theses Consistent? Philosophical Studies 38 (3):309 - 320.
Panu Raatikainen (2005). On How to Avoid the Indeterminacy of Translation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):395-413.
Added to index2011-01-27
Total downloads40 ( #33,679 of 722,765 )
Recent downloads (6 months)14 ( #8,829 of 722,765 )
How can I increase my downloads?