Bayes and bust: Simplicity as a problem for a probabilist's approach to confirmation [Book Review]

The central problem with Bayesian philosophy of science is that it cannot take account of the relevance of simplicity and unification to confirmation, induction, and scientific inference. The standard Bayesian folklore about factoring simplicity into the priors, and convergence theorems as a way of grounding their objectivity are some of the myths that Earman's book does not address adequately. 1Review of John Earman: Bayes or Bust?, Cambridge, MA. MIT Press, 1992, £33.75cloth.
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/46.3.399
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Michael Huemer (2009). When is Parsimony a Virtue? Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):216-236.
Jan Sprenger (2013). The Role of Bayesian Philosophy Within Bayesian Model Selection. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (1):101-114.

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