Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):437-52 (1994)
|Abstract||Abstract Ramsey, Stick and Garon (1991) argue that if the correct theory of mind is some parallel distributed processing theory, then folk psychology must be false. Their idea is that if the nodes and connections that encode one representation are causally active then all representations encoded by the same set of nodes and connections are also causally active. We present a clear, and concrete, counterexample to RSG's argument. In conclusion, we suggest that folk psychology and connectionism are best understood as complementary theories. Each has different limitations, yet each will co?evolve with the other in an overlapping domain of ?normal? psychology|
|Keywords||Connectionism Folk Psychology Science Garon, J Ramsey, W Stich, S|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Ian Ravenscroft, Folk Psychology as a Theory. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stephen P. Stich (1996). Deconstructing the Mind. In Deconstructing the Mind. Oxford University Press, 1996.
Paul Smolensky (1995). On the Projectable Predicates of Connectionist Psychology: A Case for Belief. In C. Macdonald & Graham F. Macdonald (eds.), Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Blackwell.
Andy Clark (1995). Connectionist Minds. In Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: Blackwell.
William Ramsey, Stephen Stich & Joseph Garon (1990). Connectionism, Eliminativism and the Future of Folk Psychology. Philosophical Perspectives 4:499-533.
George Botterill (1994). Beliefs, Functionally Discrete States, and Connectionist Networks. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (3):899-906.
William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & J. Garon (1991). Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology. In William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Lawrence Erlbaum.
William Ramsey (1994). Distributed Representation and Causal Modularity: A Rejoinder to Forster and Saidel. Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):453-61.
Hugh Clapin (1991). Connectionism Isn't Magic. Minds and Machines 1 (2):167-84.
Malcolm Forster & Eric Saidel (1994). Connectionism and the Fate of Folk Psychology: A Reply to Ramsey, Stich and Garon. Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):437 – 452.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads36 ( #38,010 of 722,765 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #17,033 of 722,765 )
How can I increase my downloads?