Connectionism and the fate of folk psychology

Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):437-52 (1994)
Abstract
Abstract Ramsey, Stick and Garon (1991) argue that if the correct theory of mind is some parallel distributed processing theory, then folk psychology must be false. Their idea is that if the nodes and connections that encode one representation are causally active then all representations encoded by the same set of nodes and connections are also causally active. We present a clear, and concrete, counterexample to RSG's argument. In conclusion, we suggest that folk psychology and connectionism are best understood as complementary theories. Each has different limitations, yet each will co?evolve with the other in an overlapping domain of ?normal? psychology
Keywords Connectionism  Folk Psychology  Science  Garon, J  Ramsey, W  Stich, S
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Stephen Mills & Paul K. Moser (1997). Critical Notices. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (1):95 – 110.
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