Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited

Theory and Decision 61 (4):329-344 (2006)
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Abstract

A mistake in “Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium (CE) in games with incomplete information” motivates a re-examination of some extensions of the solution concept that Aumann introduced.

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Risk-neutral equilibria of noncooperative games.Robert Nau - 2015 - Theory and Decision 78 (2):171-188.

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