David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Minds and Machines 16 (3):319-338 (2006)
The likelihood theory of evidence (LTE) says, roughly, that all the information relevant to the bearing of data on hypotheses (or models) is contained in the likelihoods. There exist counterexamples in which one can tell which of two hypotheses is true from the full data, but not from the likelihoods alone. These examples suggest that some forms of scientific reasoning, such as the consilience of inductions (Whewell, 1858. In Novum organon renovatum (Part II of the 3rd ed.). The philosophy of the inductive sciences. London: Cass, 1967), cannot be represented within Bayesian and Likelihoodist philosophies of science.
|Keywords||The likelihood principle The law of likelihood Evidence Bayesianism Likelihoodism Curve fitting Regression Asymmetry of cause and effect|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Malcolm Forster (2007). A Philosopher's Guide to Empirical Success. Philosophy of Science 74 (5):588-600.
Theo A. F. Kuipers (2009). Empirical Progress and Truth Approximation by the 'Hypothetico-Probabilistic Method'. Erkenntnis 70 (3):313 - 330.
Similar books and articles
Steven Orla Kimbrough (1980). On the Use of Likelihood as a Guide to Truth. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:117 - 128.
Simon Venn, Jonathan Evans & Aidan Feeney (2008). Rarity, Pseudodiagnosticity and Bayesian Reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning 14 (3):209-230.
Aidan Feeney, Jonathan Evans & Simon Venn (2008). Rarity, Pseudodiagnosticity and Bayesian Reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning 14 (3):209 – 230.
James Hawthorne (2011). Confirmation Theory. In Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm Forster (eds.), Philosophy of Statistics, Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Volume 7. Elsevier.
Niki Verschueren, Walter Schaeken & G. (2005). A Dual-Process Specification of Causal Conditional Reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning 11 (3):239 – 278.
Patrick Forber (2012). Modeling Scientific Evidence: The Challenge of Specifying Likelihoods. In. In Henk W. de Regt (ed.), Epsa Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. 55--65.
Joseph Y. Halpern & Riccardo Pucella (2009). Evidence with Uncertain Likelihoods. Synthese 171 (1):111 - 133.
Benjamin C. Jantzen (2014). Piecewise Versus Total Support: How to Deal with Background Information in Likelihood Arguments. Philosophy of Science 81 (3):313-331.
Barry Loewer, Robert Laddaga & Roger Rosenkrantz (1978). On The Likelihood Principle and a Supposed Antinomy. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1978:279 - 286.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads17 ( #99,014 of 1,102,917 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #62,002 of 1,102,917 )
How can I increase my downloads?