Forever beyond our grasp?
Biology and Philosophy 23 (1):135-141 (2007)
| Abstract | Does science successfully uncover the deep structure of the natural world? Or are the depths forever beyond our epistemic grasp? Since the decline of logical positivism and logical empiricism, scientific realism has become the consensus view: of course our scientific theories apprehend the deep structure of the world. What else could explain the remarkable success of science? This is the explanationist defense of scientific realism, the “ultimate argument.” Kyle Stanford starts here and, using the history of theorizing about biological inheritance as his case study, constructs a convincing argument against the realist consensus in his thought provoking book, Exceeding Our Grasp.1 Here I will review the core of Stanford’s new argument for instrumentalism (§ 1) and discuss his considered view of theoretical science (§ 2). | |||||||||
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Anjan Chakravartty (2008). What You Don't Know Can't Hurt You: Realism and the Unconceived. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 137 (1):149 - 158.
Gerald Doppelt (2005). Empirical Success or Explanatory Success: What Does Current Scientific Realism Need to Explain? Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1076-1087.
Patrick Enfield (2008). P. Kyle Stanford Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):881-895.
David Harker (2008). P. Kyle Stanford:Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives,:Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. Philosophy of Science 75 (2):251-253.
P. Kyle Stanford (2006). Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. Oxford University Press.
Arthur Fine (2008). Review: Epistemic Instrumentalism, Exceeding Our Grasp. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 137 (1):135 - 139.
Arthur Fine (2008). Epistemic Instrumentalism, Exceeding Our Grasp. Philosophical Studies 137 (1).
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