Minds and Machines 21 (1):57-72 (2011)
|Abstract||William Rapaport, in How Helen Keller used syntactic semantics to escape from a Chinese Room, (Rapaport 2006), argues that Helen Keller was in a sort of Chinese Room, and that her subsequent development of natural language fluency illustrates the flaws in Searle’s famous Chinese Room Argument and provides a method for developing computers that have genuine semantics (and intentionality). I contend that his argument fails. In setting the problem, Rapaport uses his own preferred definitions of semantics and syntax, but he does not translate Searle’s Chinese Room argument into that idiom before attacking it. Once the Chinese Room is translated into Rapaport’s idiom (in a manner that preserves the distinction between meaningful representations and uninterpreted symbols), I demonstrate how Rapaport’s argument fails to defeat the CRA. This failure brings a crucial element of the Chinese Room Argument to the fore: the person in the Chinese Room is prevented from connecting the Chinese symbols to his/her own meaningful experiences and memories. This issue must be addressed before any victory over the CRA is announced|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
William Rapaport (2011). Yes, She Was! Minds and Machines 21 (1):3-17.
William Rapaport (2011). Yes, She Was! Reply to Ford’s “Helen KellerWas Never in a Chinese Room”. Minds and Machines 21 (1):3-17.
William J. Rapaport (2006). How Helen Keller Used Syntactic Semantics to Escape From a Chinese Room. Minds and Machines 16 (4):381-436.
William J. Rapaport (2006). How Helen Keller Used Syntactic Semantics to Escape From a Chinese Room. Minds and Machines 16 (4).
Neal Jahren (1990). Can Semantics Be Syntactic? Synthese 82 (3):309-28.
Hanoch Ben-Yami (1993). A Note on the Chinese Room. Synthese 95 (2):169-72.
Koji Tanaka (2004). Minds, Programs, and Chinese Philosophers: A Chinese Perspective on the Chinese Room. Sophia 43 (1):61-72.
Norman Y. Teng (2000). A Cognitive Analysis of the Chinese Room Argument. Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):313-24.
Simone Gozzano (1997). The Chinese Room Argument: Consciousness and Understanding. In Matjaz Gams, M. Paprzycki & X. Wu (eds.), Mind Versus Computer: Were Dreyfus and Winograd Right? Amsterdam: IOS Press.
B. Jack Copeland (1993). The Curious Case of the Chinese Gym. Synthese 95 (2):173-86.
B. Jack Copeland (2003). The Chinese Room From a Logical Point of View. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
Herbert A. Simon & Stuart A. Eisenstadt (2003). A Chinese Room That Understands. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
Peter Kugel (2004). The Chinese Room is a Trick. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):153-154.
Andrew Melnyk (1996). Searle's Abstract Argument Against Strong AI. Synthese 108 (3):391-419.
Added to index2010-11-18
Total downloads20 ( #61,442 of 548,984 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,320 of 548,984 )
How can I increase my downloads?