Is Kant a Moral Constructivist or a Moral Realist?

European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):170-196 (2013)
Abstract
: The dominant interpretation of Kant as a moral constructivist has recently come under sustained philosophical attack by those defending a moral realist reading of Kant. In light of this, should we read Kant as endorsing moral constructivism or moral realism? In answering this question we encounter disagreement in regard to two key independence claims. First, the independence of the value of persons from the moral law (an independence that is rejected) and second, the independence of the content and authority of the moral law from actual acts of willing on behalf of those bound by that law (an independence that is upheld). The resulting position, which is called not ‘all the way down’ constructivism, is attributed to Kant
Keywords Kant  Moral Realism  Moral Constructivism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,561
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Michael E. Bratman (1992). Shared Cooperative Activity. Philosophical Review 101 (2):327-341.

View all 42 references

Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Patrick Kain (2004). Self-Legislation in Kant's Moral Philosophy. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 86 (3):257-306.
Jill Hernandez (2010). Impermissibility and Kantian Moral Worth. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (4):403 - 419.
Barbara Herman (2007). Moral Literacy. Harvard University Press.
R. Sebastian (2007). Comments on Guyer. Inquiry 50 (5):489 – 496.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2010-12-25

Total downloads

87 ( #13,693 of 1,098,129 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

18 ( #7,755 of 1,098,129 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.