John Locke and Personal Identity: Immortality and Bodily Resurrection in 17th-Century Philosophy

Continuum (2010)
Abstract
Introduction -- John Locke and the problem of personal identity : the principium individuationis, personal immortality, and bodily resurrection -- On separation and immortality : Descartes and the nature of the soul -- On materialism and immortality or Hobbes' rejection of the natural argument for the immortality of the soul -- Henry More and John Locke on the dangers of materialism : immateriality, immortality, immorality, and identity -- Robert Boyle : on seeds, cannibalism, and the resurrection of the body -- Locke's theory of personal identity in its context : a reassessment of classic objections.
Keywords Identity (Psychology  Immortality  Future life  Resurrection  Philosophy, Modern
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Call number B1297.F67 2010
ISBN(s) 9781847061454   1847061451
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